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Abstract. In the last decade, the debate about the ontological foundations of rei-
fied temporal logics (RTLs) has been relatively quiet, even though we think some
problems still exist. In this paper, we identify some of these problems and propose
(partial) solutions to them in a FOL framework. States are here characterized (at
the syntactic level) as truth-makers of propositions—they reify true propositions—
and events are built from states. These choices make the event-state distinction
much crisper than the one characterized in terms of the (meta-)predicates HOLDS
vs. OCCURS, which are necessary in RTLs but not in our theory. We also offer some
epistemological arguments in favor of this choice.
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1. Introduction
In the 90s, Galton [1] first, and Vila and Reichgelt [2] later, start criticizing the so-
called reified temporal logics (RTLs) [3,4,5,6,1,7,2]—the most known being the situa-
tion calculus [8] and the event calculus [9]2—from an ontological point of view. One
of the main problem they point out concerns the ontological nature of the reified enti-
ties. Reification—a technique nowadays relatively common in knowledge representation
[12] and conceptual modeling [13]—allows one to introduce entities that denote propo-
sitional terms in the domain of quantification. Usually, two kinds of reified entities are
distinguished in RTLs: fluents (or states) and events. Fluents and events are related to
instants (or intervals) of time through some ‘meta-predicates’. The most common ones
are HOLDS( f , t), which stands for ‘the fluent f is true at time t’, and OCCURS(e, t), which
stands for ‘the event e occurs (happens) at time t’.
Galton, Vila and Reichgelt noted that the reified events are actually event types, as
the same event can re-occur several times (analogously for fluents). This contrasts with
the view on events usually adopted in philosophy and linguistics [14], where events are
considered as tokens. Those authors follow this tradition and consider event-tokens in-
stead of event-types. We agree with these criticisms, but we think that (i) some aspects
of the proposed solutions are not completely satisfactory—the solution proposed by Vila
and Reichgelt is discussed in detail in Section 3.2—and (ii) there are additional ontolog-
ical problems that have never been taken into account. In this work, we identify some
1Corresponding Author: Via alla Cascata 56/C, Povo, 38123, Trento, Italy; E-mail: bottibenevides@unitn.it.
2[10] and [11] are good overviews.
of these problems and discuss alternative ways to address them. Methodologically, our
investigation is guided by the RTLs, however the resulting framework provides an anal-
ysis of the ontological nature of states and events in a FOL setting (avoiding then the
introduction of an ad hoc semantics for meta-predicates). Our approach has three main
characteristics. First, in contrast to the usual strategy followed by RTLs, in our frame-
work, states are not reifications of propositional terms. Our states exist in time as objects
do and they correspond to (but are not) true propositions. When a proposition is true,
a corresponding state exists and vice versa (Section 2). Our approach is then consistent
with one of the main philosophical view that assumes states to be the truth-makers of
propositions, what exists in the world that makes propositions (linguistic entities) true
[15]. Second, our states and events are completely specified. Differently from the (neo-)
Davidsonian approaches, we provide explicit identity conditions for them (Section 2).
Third, our events are built from states, that is, they group states according to a definitory
unity criterion. Section 4 considers two alternative constructions: (i) events as mereologi-
cal sums of instantaneous states, and (ii) events supervening or emerging from persisting
states. This last option allows for a conceptual or cognitive perspective on emergence,
where events(-types) are seen as a compact and cognitively-oriented tool to understand
the ‘world’s dynamics’.
2. The Basic Framework
We consider 3 disjoint basic categories: time (tm), object (ob), and state of affairs, or
simply state, (st). We leave open if tm-instances, called times, are punctual or extended
atomic entities. Time is linear and discrete (the precedence relation is noted≤). Objects—
also called substances, endurants, or continuants—are wholly present at every time they
exist, e.g., tables, persons, bits of stuff. States correspond to—using the terminology of
Kim [16]—exemplifications by objects of (contingent) properties at a time, i.e., a state
corresponds to the fact that an object (several objects) has a given property (are in a given
relation) at a given time. E.g., Luca’s being 180cm high now, Luca’s being enrolled in
the University of Trento now.
The framework is formally characterized as follows. Both objects and states exist in
time (a1)-(a2), where εt x stands for “x exists at time t”.3 States are covered by a finite
set P¯ of unary predicates (a3) that, intuitively, individuate all the states that correspond
to the exemplification of the same property or relation. The atemporal primitives (i
hold between objects and states (a4) and identify the ith object involved in the state
(a5)—the ith participant—that necessarily exists when the state exists (a6) and (d1). By
(d3)4, we define n-ary participations—where α is the maximal finite arity of st-instances
(that is also the number of (i primitives). For each P¯ ∈ P¯, an axiom with form (a7)
sets to n the number of participants in all the P¯-states—the arity of P¯-states. (a8) is the
identity criterion for states: temporally overlapping (d2) states belonging to the same type
and having the same participants are identical. Intuitively, at any time, the same objects
cannot exemplify the same relation in two different ways. (a8) allows the introduction of
(d4)—where   is a description operator a` la Russell.5 It is then possible to introduce a
3We write Pt x instead of P(x, t) to highlight the time-argument.
4 xn is a shortcut for x1, . . . , xn.
5ψ( x(φ(x))) is equivalent to ∃x(φ(x)∧∀y(φ(y)→ y= x)∧ψ(x)).
setD of descriptions that are in a 1-1 relation with the predicates P¯ ∈ P¯. The description
relative to the predicate P¯ ∈ P¯ is noted p. As (a8) does not apply to states of different type,
it is possible to have pt xn ,qt xn (states do not reduce to tuples). Unlike Kim’s identity
condition—[x,P, t] = [y,Q, t′] if and only if x = y, P = Q, and t = t′ ([x,P, t] corresponds
to pt x)—our framework allows for both (i) pt xn =qt xn with p different from q, i.e., the
predicates in P¯ do not necessarily partition st, and thus states may belong to several
types; and (ii) pt xn =pt′ xn with t, t′, i.e., states can persist through time.
d1 xRy, ∀t(εt x→ εty) (temporal inclusion)
d2 x⊗y, ∃t(εt x∧ εty) (temporal overlap)
d3 xn( s,∧1≤i≤n(xi(i s)∧n<i≤α¬∃x(x(i s)
d4 pt xn ,  s(P¯s∧ εt s∧ xn( s) (state description)
a1 εt x→ tmt∧ (obx∨stx)
a2 obx∨stx→∃t(εt x)
a3 sts↔∨P¯∈P¯ P¯s
a4 x(i s→ obx∧sts
a5 x(i s∧ y(i s→ x=y
a6 x(i s→ sR x
a7 P¯s→∃xn(xn( s)
a8 P¯s∧ P¯s′∧ s⊗s′∧1≤i≤α∀x(x(i s↔ x(i s′)→ s= s′
a9 Pt xn↔∃s(P¯s∧ εt s∧ xn( s)
The usual method to avoid state-reification, the method of temporal arguments
(MTA) [2], consists of the introduction of a time as an additional argument of (some of)
the predicates and functions in the vocabulary. For instance, TIREDx becomes TIREDt x.
While state-reification and MTA are usually considered as alternative methods, here we
try to connect them in an explicit way. We think that this move has three advantages.
First, the link between states and propositions can be clearly stated at the syntactic level.
This enables a better characterization of the nature of states. Second, meta-predicates like
HOLDS and OCCURS (and their ad-hoc semantics [5,2]) are not necessary. Third, primitive
predicates (on objects) can be directly axiomatized without recurring to HOLDS as re-
quired, for instance, in the Event Calculus, e.g., HOLDS(on(x,y), t)→¬HOLDS(on(y, x), t).
More technically, our idea is to reify into states temporally qualified and closed
atomic FOL propositions (about objects). Let V be the extra-logical vocabulary of the
FOL theory under consideration and P ⊂ V be the set of predicates with one argument
of type tm and all the other arguments of type ob. We assume that all the predicates in
P are temporally contingent—i.e., Pt x∧ εt′ x∧ t , t′ → Pt′ x is not provable—i.e., kinds
like ‘being a person’ or ‘being an electron’, as well as ε, are excluded from P.6 We also
assume P to be finite and in a 1-1 relation with types of states in P¯. P ∈ P indicates the
predicate associated with P¯ ∈ P¯, i.e., P¯-states are reifications of P-atomic propositions.
(a9) formalizes the link between propositions and states. There is a unique state
that satisfies the condition P¯s∧ εt s∧ xn( s, it is pt xn. Consequently, pt xn exists—in
terms of ∃, not ε—only when Pt xn holds, i.e., states reify only true propositions; their
existence contributes to how the world is. This closely corresponds to Kim’s existence
6For kinds like ‘being a person’, it is usually assumed that their ‘truth-makers’ are the persons themselves,
i.e., no states exist in correspondence with kinds (see [15]). Similarly for atemporal relations among objects.
Here, we adopt this view. However, our framework can be adapted to include temporally necessary predicates.
condition: “the state [x,P, t] exists if and only if substance x has property P at time t”
[16].7 Vice versa, non atomic closed formulas with existential or universal quantifiers do
not introduce states but only (existential) constraints on them. In particular, existential
quantifiers, as well as disjunctions and negations of atomic propositions, introduce a sort
of indeterminism: different configurations of the world can make them true.
3. Eventualities
We extend our basic framework to cope with a deeper comparison with RTLs and to
have the formal tools to represent events (Section 4). We introduce (i) a new category
called, following [17], eventuality (ev), that subsumes st (a10); and (ii) a parthood rela-
tion, xv y, standing for “x is part of y”. Usual mereological notions are defined in (d5)-
(d9). We consider an atomic classical extensional mereology closed under sum: parthood
holds only between eventualities (a11), it implies temporal inclusion (a12), it is reflexive,
antisymmetric, transitive, and atomic (a13), it satisfies the strong supplementation prin-
ciple (a14), and it is closed under sum (a15). In this theory, eventualities are uniquely
decomposable into atoms (see [18]). Sometimes we write x+y to refer to the z such that
zΣxy. (a16) enforces states and mereological atoms to coincide. Hence ev is the closure
of st under mereological sum: states are the building blocks of eventualities.
d5 x@y, xvy∧ x,y (proper part)
d6 xGy, ∃z(zv x∧ zvy) (overlap)
d7 xΣyn , ∀w(wG x↔ (wGy1∨ · · ·∨wGyn)) (sum)
d8 Λx, evx∧¬∃y(y@ x) (atom)
d9 x Λvy, Λx∧ xvy (atomic part)
a10 stx→ evx
a11 xvy→ evx∧evy
a12 xvy→ xRy
a13 ∃y(yΛv x)
a14 ¬xvy→∃z(zv x∧¬zGy)
a15 evx∧evy→∃s(sΣxy)
a16 Λx↔ stx
With a slight abuse of notation, (d10) extends ε to eventualities. The participants in
an eventuality at a time t are the participants in at least one of the states that compose
it and exist at t (d11). (d12) just abstracts from time. Hence, the participants in the part
participate also in the whole. A non standard notion of temporal slice is defined in (d13):
even though an eventuality has a unique temporal slice at any time it exists, it may have
the same temporal slice at different times. This is the case with persisting states (atoms).
d10 εte, ∃s(sΛve∧ εt s)
d11 x(t e,
∨
1≤i≤α∃s(sΛve∧ x(i s∧ εt s)
d12 x( e, ∃t(x(t e)
d13 xt y, ∀z(zv x↔ εtz∧ zvy)
7While Kim’s properties are in the domain of quantification, we have a 1-1 relation between P and P¯.
3.1. Types of Eventualities
Eventualities can be classified according to their behavior with respect to their temporal
extensions, participants, and atomic components. An eventuality is instantaneous, 〈i〉ev,
if it exists at a unique time (d14) and it is convex, 〈c〉ev, if it exists over a convex, with
respect to time-precedence ≤, set of times (d15). Dissective eventualities, 〈d〉ev, are sums
of states of the same type (d16), while for homogeneous ones, 〈h〉ev, all their temporal
slices are states of the same type (d17). Homogeneity is stronger than dissectivity, since
it requires that at every time only a state compose the eventuality. For instance, if εt s∧
εt s′∧ s, s′∧ P¯s∧ P¯s′, then 〈d〉ev(s+s′) but ¬〈h〉ev(s+s′). An eventuality is stable, 〈s〉ev,
if it is dissective and all its parts have the same participants (in the same order) (d18).
The previous definitions can be concatenated as in (d19), e.g., 〈c,h〉ev individuates
convex homogeneous eventualities. Maximality constraints can be added (d20). Maxi-
mally homogeneous eventualities are the sum of all the states of the same type, while
maximally stable ones are the sum of all the states of the same type that have the same
participants.m〈s〉evs are abstractions of states (of one type) from time, whilem〈h〉evs are
abstractions from time and participants. States are homogeneous and stable, but neither
convex—nothing rules out intermittent atoms—nor maximally stable—nothing excludes
the sum of two different instantaneous atoms s and s′ from being stable.
d14 〈i〉eve, eve∧∃!t(εte)
d15 〈c〉eve, eve∧∀t0t1t(εt0e∧ εt1e∧ t0≤ t≤ t1→ εte)
d16 〈d〉eve,∨P¯∈P¯∀s(sΛve→ P¯s)
d17 〈h〉eve,∨P¯∈P¯∀t(εte→∃s(st e∧ P¯s))
d18 〈s〉eve, 〈d〉eve∧∀ss′(sΛve∧ s′ Λve→∧i∀x(x(i s↔ x(i s′))
d19 〈x,y〉eve, 〈x〉eve∧ 〈y〉eve
d20 m〈x〉eve, 〈x〉eve∧¬∃e′(〈x〉eve′∧ e@e′)
3.2. Comparison with RTLs
In RTLs, fluents and states are usually represented as total functions8 applied to ob-
jects, e.g., respectively, tired(john) and tired(john, t).9 Differently, in our framework,
the existence of john does not entails the one of tiredt(john), assuming tired ∈ D.
Our rationale for avoiding total functions is that total functions force states to be in
the domain of quantification even if they do not hold; e.g., the state tired(john, t′) s.t.
¬HOLDS(tired(john, t′)) is in the domain of quantification.10 Actually, for every time
and object in the domain, there will be a tired-state. Similarly for fluents. This seems to
contradict the Kim’s existence condition. Contrariwise, our states correspond only to true
propositions; HOLDS does not make sense for them, they just exist in time. While states
(fluents) seem reifications of temporal (atemporal) propositions—they have a linguistic
8Functions are noted in bold, constants in typewriter type.
9States were introduced to account for the criticisms originally raised in [1] regarding the fact that fluents
are reifications of types instead of tokens. States are then represented as total functions where at least one of
the arguments is a time point or an interval.
10HOLDS(fxn, t) means that the fluent fxn holds (is true) at t. Concerning states, as the state-function f has
already a temporal argument, there is no need to temporally qualify HOLDS, e.g., HOLDS(tired(john, t)). Some
approaches consider a time interval or a couple of time points [2] as arguments of HOLDS.
nature—our states can be seen as truth-makers of propositions [15], i.e., what exists ‘in
reality’ that makes propositions true.11
The Token-Reified-Logic (TRL) [2] also suffers from the issue just discussed. How-
ever, TRL solves some problems of RTLs: it assumes event-tokens (instead of event-
types) and proposes a clear semantics for HOLDS and OCCURS. TLR represents states by
means of functions that have two (possibly equal) instants as arguments—the start and
the end of the state—e.g., tired(john,3pm,4pm) meaning “John’s being tired from 3pm
to 4pm”. In TRL, the fluent counterpart can be specified by means of the function TYPE
from states (events) to functions from couples of times to states (events). For instance,
TYPE(tired(john,3pm,4pm))(t1, t2) selects the state tired(john, t1, t2). TYPE is a sort of
lambda abstraction from the temporal extension, but not from the function (e.g., tired)
and the participants (e.g., john). Now, we show how some ontological assumptions in
TRL can be formulated in our framework. States are convex and satisfy (f1): given a
state s1 = f(xn, ts, te), for all the subintervals of [ts, te], e.g. [t1, t2], there exists a differ-
ent state of the same type and with the same participants: s2 = f(xn, t1, t2). TRL provides
no structural relation between states. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that (i) the
functions f correspond to our descriptions; (ii) the temporal inclusion of states generated
by the same function and participants is parthood (e.g., s2 is part of s1); and (iii) states
with form f(xn, t, t) are atoms. Given these assumptions, the notion of state in TRL can
be characterized in our framework by adding (a17) and assuming states to be 〈c,h,s〉ev-
instances. Yet, we can write 3pm≤ t≤4pm→ ∃x(x = tiredtjohn) without committing to
specific persistence conditions of states or to how many states exist. Because our states
correspond to true propositions (so they necessarily hold at some time), fluents and TYPE
can be only approximated by summing up all the states of a given type with the same par-
ticipants, i.e., m〈s〉ev-instances. We can also abstract from participants:m〈d〉ev-instances
are the sums of all the states of a given type, independently of their participants.
f1 HOLDS(f(xn, ts, te))∧ ts≤ t1≤ t2≤ te→ HOLDS(f(xn, t1, t2))
a17 Λs→ 〈i〉evs
4. Events
Almost all the reified-theories distinguish states from events (CLIMB [19] is one excep-
tion).12 States hold or are true, while events occur or happen. Both states and events
are represented by means of total functions, e.g., for all x, y, ts, te, on(x,y, ts, te) is usu-
ally considered as a state, while stab(x,y, ts, te) as an event. Given on(x,y, ts, te), for
all the subintervals of [ts, te], there exists a different on-state involving x and y, i.e.,
on(x,y, t1, t2),on(x,y, t3, t4) if and only if t1, t3 or t2, t4. The same holds for events. The
difference between states and events is characterized by means of the primitives HOLDS
(for states) and OCCURS (for events) through (f1) (see the previous Section) and (f2).
f2 OCCURS(p(xn, ts, te))∧ ts≤ t1≤ t2≤ te→¬OCCURS(p(xn, t1, t2))
f3 Pixn∧ jv i→ P jxn
f4 Pixn∧ j@ i→¬P jxn
11Note, however, that we do not commit to the ontological primacy of states with respect to propositions,
only a correspondence between states and true propositions is assumed.
12We consider here the states introduced in [2], even though similar arguments apply to fluents.
In a non reified framework that follows MTA, (f1) and (f2) seem to closely correspond to
(temporal) homeomericity (f3) and anti-homeomericity (f4) (where i and j are intervals
andv is parthood). In (f3), one could reduce the truth of Pixn to the truth of all the Pt xn
with t Λv i, i.e., the truth-makers of Pt xn would make also true Pixn. Vice versa, according
to (f4), there are no t Λ@i where Pt xn is true, as the relation P between the objects xn holds
only at the whole interval. One needs then to understand what are the truth-makers of
Pixn in this second case. One possibility, the one we develop here, is to assume that Pixn is
reducible to a complex formula that involves atomic predicates holding over subintervals
of i.13 P is a sort of emergent property [20], a property with a complex structure whose
truth depends on the truth, during i, of simpler properties. We assume that this never holds
for the predicates in P that, even when extended to intervals, are supposed to satisfy (f3).
The reduction of predicates satisfying (f4) to complex (diachronic) formulas allows us
to see the entities that correspond to their truth, that we call events, as temporal entities
with a complex structure, sort of trajectories across states.
A narrative or, let us say, a movie can be seen as a sequence of temporally labeled
snapshots or frames. The content of each frame, the way the world is at a given time,
may be captured by a complex (synchronic) formula belonging to the FOL-theory under
development. In our framework, we can associate a frame with temporal label t to the set
of states that exist at t.14 Vice versa, in general, events correspond to complex diachronic
formulas, to set of states that exist at different times, therefore they require sequences of
frames to be taken into account. Events have a conceptual role: they offer an abstract and
dynamically-oriented point of view on narratives. From an epistemological or perceptual
perspective, states may be seen as ‘time stamped data’, ‘basic observations’, ‘sensory
atoms’, or, in a more subjective way, as ‘qualia’ (see [21]). Perception organizes sensory
outputs by synchronically or, using memory, diachronically grouping them in units that
allow us to interact with the world in a quick and fruitful way (see [22] for an introduction
and [23] for perception of events). Similarly, states can be organized by grouping them
into events that help us to understand the dynamics of the world in a cognitive-friendly
fashion. Events can be reduced to mereological sum of states only when we assume
instantaneous states (Section 4.1) or a perdurantist view. Otherwise, one needs to see
events as higher level entities [24] and to allow them to change their constituent-states
or to cease to exist even when these states continue to exist (Section 4.2). This sort of
dichotomy is not new and originated lively philosophical discussions around the notion
of material constitution (see [25]). The view that events are the result of a state-grouping
is analogous to the one developed in [26], where courses of events are partial functions
from space-time regions to sets of facts, i.e., true or false propositions. The framework
proposed by [26] is more abstract than ours; however, the idea that events are at higher
level of abstraction with respect to states is already present.
4.1. Events from Instantaneous States
We consider here instantaneous states: stx→ 〈i〉evx. In this case, the temporal slices of
persisting eventualities are always proper parts of them and pure perdurantism can be
13Another possibility is to assume that the truth of Pi xn depends on the truth of other predicates that holds
before or after i.
14The axioms that characterize the predicates in P correspond to (possibly complex) existential generic
dependencies between states, i.e., they can be seen as the laws that regulate the world.
pursuit. Note that if ON and STAB belong to P, both ONt xy and STABt xy correspond to
states. By putting STAB in P, the developer decided that the existence of ¯STAB-instances
can be acquired looking at a single frame, no dynamics or structure is present in them.
This choice can be motivated by a coarse time-granularity, frames could be seen as ‘short
movies’ in this case. ¯STAB-instances can be involved in dependence or causation relations
as all the other states, no special behavior is attributed to them a priory.
At this point, we could accept as events all non-atomic eventualities, or, more
strongly, all the persisting eventualities (including stable ones). The user has the possi-
bility to filter the eventualities by defining some specific types of events according to
her needs and the expressive power of the FOL-theory under construction. These types
of events correspond to some structural constraints among the component states. In this
perspective, event-types correspond to patterns, regularities, or trajectories identifiable in
the sequences of the states of the world and, ultimately, in the world itself.
4.2. Events from Persisting States
We consider here maximal stable states: stx↔m〈s〉evx. This hypothesis entails that,
given the objects xn, a unique state corresponds to Pt xn whatever t. Less restrictive as-
sumptions for states, e.g., 〈s〉evx or 〈s〉evx∧m〈c〉evx, are possible. We focus on the strong
one because, from a cognitive standpoint, it parallels the re-identification of a single state
in all the frames where Pt xn holds, a quite realistic hypothesis. In this case, states can
be seen as persisting entities that are wholly present at different times, sort of endurants.
Because of that, to build complex entities from states, one incurs in all the usual problems
linked to material constitution and change (see [25]). In [27], Galton avoids committing
to processes as endurants; we follow him and leave this question aside for our states.
To address these problems, we endorse a simplified version of the theory of levels
introduced in [24]. We assume that events—evnx stands for ‘x is an event’—are higher
level entities grounded (at a time) on eventualities—x≺t y stands for ‘the eventuality x
fully grounds the event y at t’, i.e., ‘y owes its existence at t to x’s existence at t’. Events
do not have temporal parts, but they can change their ground through time. The primi-
tives evn and≺ are characterized by axioms (a18)-(a26) and definitions (d21)-(d23). Ac-
cordingly, events are in time and when they exist, they are fully grounded exactly on one
eventuality. Moreover, partial grounding (d21) implies the existence of a disjoint (par-
tial) ground (a25) (a sort of supplementation principle). (a26) is the identity condition for
events: two events are identical if (i) they are temporally co-extensional and (ii) they co-
incide at all the times (i.e., at every time they exist, all the states that partially ground one
event partially ground also the other and vice versa). This explains in which sense events
are built from states. One can exclude events that are temporally co-extensive with, and
always grounded on, a single eventuality by introducing (f5) as axiom. Due to lack of
space, we cannot compare our theory with Galton’s processes composing events [27].
d21 xlty, ∃z(z≺t y∧ x@ z∧ εt x) (partial grounding)
d22 xvt y, evnx∧∀z(zlt x→ zlty) (temporary part)
d23 x≡t y, xvt y∧ yvt x (coincidence)
a18 evnx→¬evx∧¬tmx∧¬obx
a19 x≺t y→ evx∧evny
a20 x≺t y→ εt x∧ εty
a21 evnx→∃t(εt x)
a22 evnx∧ εt x→∃y(y≺t x)
a23 x≺t y∧ z≺t y→ x=z
a24 x≺t y∧ z@ x→ εtz
a25 xlty→∃z(zlty∧¬zG x)
a26 evnx∧evny∧∀t(εt x→x≡t y)∧∀t(εty→x≡t y)→x=y
f5 evnx→¬∃s(∀t(εt x→ s≺t x)∧∀t(εt s→ s≺t x))
4.3. Changes
Related to the notions of state and event is the notion of change. There is no much
agreement in what is a change, but it is useful to distinguish changes in objects from the
more general notion of changes as transitions between states. Problems arise when trying
to circumscribe the “scope” of a change: what seems a change may not be a change, if a
wider scope is taken. Lombard [28] addresses them through the notion of quality space
assuming that (basic) changes are movements of objects through quality spaces. Another
problem is if changes are in time (“when changes occur?”). For Galton [17], changes are
instantaneous transitions. He claims that such transitions do not occur at any time, but
between times. Consequently, he includes these ‘interfaces’ among the temporal entities.
Our framework can be conservatively extended to accommodate both positions.
4.4. Partially Specified Events
In our framework, both eventualities and events are fully specified. For instance, the ex-
istential conditions (a3) and (a7) together with the unicity conditions (a5) and (a8) assure
that when there is a state, its type and all its participants must be determined. For instance,
by assuming that STAB (binary) and STAB WITH (ternary) are both inP, in our framework
one necessarily has stabt xy,stab witht xyz, because the two states have different partic-
ipants. Similarly, in the case of events (see (a21), (a22), (a23), and (a26)). First of all,
note that there are approaches in linguistics that are closer to ours. For instance, Dowty
[29] represents n-ary verbs by (n+1)-ary predicates and adjuncts are distinct predicates,
conjoined with the verb-predicate. Here, predicates have a fixed arity, and therefore what
said before about existential and identity conditions holds. Second, in a neo-Davidsonian
context, one can add constraints like STABBING(e)→ ∃i(INSTRUMENT(e, i)). However,
these constraints individuate only the necessary participants. Third, by rejecting (a22)
(and (a26)), we could allow partially described events. However, we would pay the same
price of neo-Davidsonian approaches, we would lose the identity condition for events.
5. Conclusion
We introduced an ontologically clean framework that does not lack expressive power
with respect to the investigated RTLs. We showed the irreducibility of events to mere-
ological sums of persisting states; however the question about the nature of events re-
mains open. In particular, our framework could be criticized because of the lack of a
real dynamics. Our world may be seen as a big collection of static entities, of states.
We suggested that the dynamics is in us. We build events and changes, we perceive
them, we use them to communicate and represent the world. For Galton [27], there must
be something in reality that serves as explanation of how events emerge from static
configurations. Galton explains such emergence in terms of processes; other authors re-
fer to dispositions. However, for Wittgenstein, “The world is the totality of facts” [30],
where facts are true states of affairs, what resembles our states. Here, our concern was
to define events, not to explain the possible reasons of their emergence. Indeed this is a
very interesting topic that merits a deeper analysis that we leave for future work.
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